MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism

Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
12/19/2017
cs.GT

Official code: erelsgl/double-auction (11 stars, LGPL-2.1, last commit 2021-04-09).

Abstract

In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auctions, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee's mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single unit and each buyer to buy a single unit. This paper presents a double-auction mechanism that handles multi-parametric agents and allows multiple units per trader, as long as the valuation functions of all traders have decreasing marginal returns. The mechanism is prior-free, ex-post individually-rational, dominant-strategy truthful and strongly-budget-balanced. Its gain-from-trade approaches the optimum when the market size is sufficiently large.

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Code Implementations(1)

erelsgl/double-auctionOfficial100%
LGPL-2.1

Implementation and simulation of double auction mechanisms

114CSS, HTMLApr 24, 20175 years agoLGPL-2.1

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Cite this paper

@article{segalhalevi2017muda,
  title  = {MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism},
  author = {Erel Segal-Halevi and Avinatan Hassidim and Yonatan Aumann},
  year   = {2017},
  eprint = {1712.06848},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.06848}
}

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