AFLOW: Developing Adversarial Examples under Extremely Noise-limited Settings

Abstract

Extensive studies have demonstrated that deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Despite the significant progress in the attack success rate that has been made recently, the adversarial noise generated by most of the existing attack methods is still too conspicuous to the human eyes and proved to be easily detected by defense mechanisms. Resulting that these malicious examples cannot contribute to exploring the vulnerabilities of existing DNNs sufficiently. Thus, to better reveal the defects of DNNs and further help enhance their robustness under noise-limited situations, a new inconspicuous adversarial examples generation method is exactly needed to be proposed. To bridge this gap, we propose a novel Normalize Flow-based end-to-end attack framework, called AFLOW, to synthesize imperceptible adversarial examples under strict constraints. Specifically, rather than the noise-adding manner, AFLOW directly perturbs the hidden representation of the corresponding image to craft the desired adversarial examples. Compared with existing methods, extensive experiments on three benchmark datasets show that the adversarial examples built by AFLOW exhibit superiority in imperceptibility, image quality and attack capability. Even on robust models, AFLOW can still achieve higher attack results than previous methods.