Dynamic Adversarial Attacks on Autonomous Driving Systems

Abstract

This paper introduces an attacking mechanism to challenge the resilience of autonomous driving systems. Specifically, we manipulate the decision-making processes of an autonomous vehicle by dynamically displaying adversarial patches on a screen mounted on another moving vehicle. These patches are optimized to deceive the object detection models into misclassifying targeted objects, e.g., traffic signs. Such manipulation has significant implications for critical multi-vehicle interactions such as intersection crossing and lane changing, which are vital for safe and efficient autonomous driving systems. Particularly, we make four major contributions. First, we introduce a novel adversarial attack approach where the patch is not co-located with its target, enabling more versatile and stealthy attacks. Moreover, our method utilizes dynamic patches displayed on a screen, allowing for adaptive changes and movement, enhancing the flexibility and performance of the attack. To do so, we design a Screen Image Transformation Network (SIT-Net), which simulates environmental effects on the displayed images, narrowing the gap between simulated and real-world scenarios. Further, we integrate a positional loss term into the adversarial training process to increase the success rate of the dynamic attack. Finally, we shift the focus from merely attacking perceptual systems to influencing the decision-making algorithms of self-driving systems. Our experiments demonstrate the first successful implementation of such dynamic adversarial attacks in real-world autonomous driving scenarios, paving the way for advancements in the field of robust and secure autonomous driving.