Differential Equation Approximations for Population Games using Elementary Probability

Semih Kara, Nuno C. Martins
12/11/2023
cs.GTcs.MAeess.SY

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Abstract

Population games model the evolution of strategic interactions among a large number of uniform agents. Due to the agents' uniformity and quantity, their aggregate strategic choices can be approximated by the solutions of a class of ordinary differential equations. This mean-field approach has found to be an effective tool of analysis. However its current proofs rely on advanced mathematical techniques, making them less accessible. In this article, we present a simpler derivation, using only undergraduate-level probability.

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Cite this paper

@article{kara2023differential,
  title  = {Differential Equation Approximations for Population Games using Elementary Probability},
  author = {Semih Kara and Nuno C. Martins},
  year   = {2023},
  eprint = {2312.07598},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.07598v1}
}

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