LLMs Can Defend Themselves Against Jailbreaking in a Practical Manner: A Vision Paper

Abstract

Jailbreaking is an emerging adversarial attack that bypasses the safety alignment deployed in off-the-shelf large language models (LLMs). A considerable amount of research exists proposing more effective jailbreak attacks, including the recent Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack, jailbreak template-based attacks such as using "Do-Anything-Now" (DAN), and multilingual jailbreak. In contrast, the defensive side has been relatively less explored. This paper proposes a lightweight yet practical defense called SELFDEFEND, which can defend against all existing jailbreak attacks with minimal delay for jailbreak prompts and negligible delay for normal user prompts. Our key insight is that regardless of the kind of jailbreak strategies employed, they eventually need to include a harmful prompt (e.g., "how to make a bomb") in the prompt sent to LLMs, and we found that existing LLMs can effectively recognize such harmful prompts that violate their safety policies. Based on this insight, we design a shadow stack that concurrently checks whether a harmful prompt exists in the user prompt and triggers a checkpoint in the normal stack once a token of "No" or a harmful prompt is output. The latter could also generate an explainable LLM response to adversarial prompts. We demonstrate our idea of SELFDEFEND works in various jailbreak scenarios through manual analysis in GPT-3.5/4. We also list three future directions to further enhance SELFDEFEND.