CBPF: Filtering Poisoned Data Based on Composite Backdoor Attack

Abstract

Backdoor attacks involve the injection of a limited quantity of poisoned examples containing triggers into the training dataset. During the inference stage, backdoor attacks can uphold a high level of accuracy for normal examples, yet when presented with trigger-containing instances, the model may erroneously predict them as the targeted class designated by the attacker. This paper explores strategies for mitigating the risks associated with backdoor attacks by examining the filtration of poisoned samples.We primarily leverage two key characteristics of backdoor attacks: the ability for multiple backdoors to exist simultaneously within a single model, and the discovery through Composite Backdoor Attack (CBA) that altering two triggers in a sample to new target labels does not compromise the original functionality of the triggers, yet enables the prediction of the data as a new target class when both triggers are present simultaneously.Therefore, a novel three-stage poisoning data filtering approach, known as Composite Backdoor Poison Filtering (CBPF), is proposed as an effective solution. Firstly, utilizing the identified distinctions in output between poisoned and clean samples, a subset of data is partitioned to include both poisoned and clean instances. Subsequently, benign triggers are incorporated and labels are adjusted to create new target and benign target classes, thereby prompting the poisoned and clean data to be classified as distinct entities during the inference stage. The experimental results indicate that CBPF is successful in filtering out malicious data produced by six advanced attacks on CIFAR10 and ImageNet-12. On average, CBPF attains a notable filtering success rate of 99.91% for the six attacks on CIFAR10. Additionally, the model trained on the uncontaminated samples exhibits sustained high accuracy levels.