Beyond Full Poisoning: Effective Availability Attacks with Partial Perturbation

Yu Zhe, Jun Sakuma
7/2/2024
cs.LGcs.CRcs.CV

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Abstract

The widespread use of publicly available datasets for training machine learning models raises significant concerns about data misuse. Availability attacks have emerged as a means for data owners to safeguard their data by designing imperceptible perturbations that degrade model performance when incorporated into training datasets. However, existing availability attacks are ineffective when only a portion of the data can be perturbed. To address this challenge, we propose a novel availability attack approach termed Parameter Matching Attack (PMA). PMA is the first availability attack capable of causing more than a 30\% performance drop when only a portion of data can be perturbed. PMA optimizes perturbations so that when the model is trained on a mixture of clean and perturbed data, the resulting model will approach a model designed to perform poorly. Experimental results across four datasets demonstrate that PMA outperforms existing methods, achieving significant model performance degradation when a part of the training data is perturbed. Our code is available in the supplementary materials.

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Cite this paper

@article{zhe2024beyond,
  title  = {Beyond Full Poisoning: Effective Availability Attacks with Partial Perturbation},
  author = {Yu Zhe and Jun Sakuma},
  year   = {2024},
  eprint = {2407.02437},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.02437v2}
}

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