How to beat a Bayesian adversary

Zihan Ding, Kexin Jin, Jonas Latz, Chenguang Liu
7/11/2024
cs.LGmath.OCstat.CO

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Abstract

Deep neural networks and other modern machine learning models are often susceptible to adversarial attacks. Indeed, an adversary may often be able to change a model's prediction through a small, directed perturbation of the model's input - an issue in safety-critical applications. Adversarially robust machine learning is usually based on a minmax optimisation problem that minimises the machine learning loss under maximisation-based adversarial attacks. In this work, we study adversaries that determine their attack using a Bayesian statistical approach rather than maximisation. The resulting Bayesian adversarial robustness problem is a relaxation of the usual minmax problem. To solve this problem, we propose Abram - a continuous-time particle system that shall approximate the gradient flow corresponding to the underlying learning problem. We show that Abram approximates a McKean-Vlasov process and justify the use of Abram by giving assumptions under which the McKean-Vlasov process finds the minimiser of the Bayesian adversarial robustness problem. We discuss two ways to discretise Abram and show its suitability in benchmark adversarial deep learning experiments.

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Cite this paper

@article{ding2024beat,
  title  = {How to beat a Bayesian adversary},
  author = {Zihan Ding and Kexin Jin and Jonas Latz and Chenguang Liu},
  year   = {2024},
  eprint = {2407.08678},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.08678v1}
}

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