MPC-Minimized Secure LLM Inference

Deevashwer Rathee, Dacheng Li, Ion Stoica, Hao Zhang, Raluca Popa
8/7/2024
cs.CRcs.AIcs.LG

No confident code implementation found for this paper.

Abstract

Many inference services based on large language models (LLMs) pose a privacy concern, either revealing user prompts to the service or the proprietary weights to the user. Secure inference offers a solution to this problem through secure multi-party computation (MPC), however, it is still impractical for modern LLM workload due to the large overhead imposed by MPC. To address this overhead, we propose Marill, a framework that adapts LLM fine-tuning to minimize MPC usage during secure inference. Marill introduces high-level architectural changes during fine-tuning that significantly reduce the number of expensive operations needed within MPC during inference, by removing some and relocating others outside MPC without compromising security. As a result, Marill-generated models are more efficient across all secure inference protocols and our approach complements MPC-friendly approximations for such operations. Compared to standard fine-tuning, Marill results in 3.6-11.3x better runtime and 2.4-6.9x better communication during secure inference across various MPC settings, while typically preserving over 90% performance across downstream tasks.

View on arXivView PDF

Code Implementations

No confident code match yet

We couldn't find an author-owned or strongly-evidenced community implementation for this paper. Any repos shown below are weak matches — verify before relying on them.

No code implementations found yet.

Know of an implementation? Let us know in the comments below!

Similar Papers

Cite this paper

@article{rathee2024mpcminimized,
  title  = {MPC-Minimized Secure LLM Inference},
  author = {Deevashwer Rathee and Dacheng Li and Ion Stoica and Hao Zhang and Raluca Popa},
  year   = {2024},
  eprint = {2408.03561},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2408.03561v1}
}

Add a badge to your README

Shows whether official code is linked for this paper.

Code of Paper badge
[![Code of Paper](https://codeofpaper.com/badge/2408.03561.svg)](https://codeofpaper.com/paper/2408.03561)

Discussion