GenTel-Safe: A Unified Benchmark and Shielding Framework for Defending Against Prompt Injection Attacks

Rongchang Li, Minjie Chen, Chang Hu, Han Chen, Wenpeng Xing +1 more
9/29/2024
cs.CRcs.LG

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Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4, LLaMA, and Qwen have demonstrated remarkable success across a wide range of applications. However, these models remain inherently vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, which can bypass existing safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for more robust attack detection methods and comprehensive evaluation benchmarks. To address these challenges, we introduce GenTel-Safe, a unified framework that includes a novel prompt injection attack detection method, GenTel-Shield, along with a comprehensive evaluation benchmark, GenTel-Bench, which compromises 84812 prompt injection attacks, spanning 3 major categories and 28 security scenarios. To prove the effectiveness of GenTel-Shield, we evaluate it together with vanilla safety guardrails against the GenTel-Bench dataset. Empirically, GenTel-Shield can achieve state-of-the-art attack detection success rates, which reveals the critical weakness of existing safeguarding techniques against harmful prompts. For reproducibility, we have made the code and benchmarking dataset available on the project page at https://gentellab.github.io/gentel-safe.github.io/.

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Cite this paper

@article{li2024gentelsafe,
  title  = {GenTel-Safe: A Unified Benchmark and Shielding Framework for Defending Against Prompt Injection Attacks},
  author = {Rongchang Li and Minjie Chen and Chang Hu and Han Chen and Wenpeng Xing and Meng Han},
  year   = {2024},
  eprint = {2409.19521},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.19521v1}
}

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