Boosting Perturbed Gradient Ascent for Last-Iterate Convergence in Games

Kenshi Abe, Mitsuki Sakamoto, Kaito Ariu, Atsushi Iwasaki
10/1/2024

No confident code implementation found for this paper.

Abstract

This paper presents a payoff perturbation technique, introducing a strong convexity to players' payoff functions in games. This technique is specifically designed for first-order methods to achieve last-iterate convergence in games where the gradient of the payoff functions is monotone in the strategy profile space, potentially containing additive noise. Although perturbation is known to facilitate the convergence of learning algorithms, the magnitude of perturbation requires careful adjustment to ensure last-iterate convergence. Previous studies have proposed a scheme in which the magnitude is determined by the distance from a periodically re-initialized anchoring or reference strategy. Building upon this, we propose Gradient Ascent with Boosting Payoff Perturbation, which incorporates a novel perturbation into the underlying payoff function, maintaining the periodically re-initializing anchoring strategy scheme. This innovation empowers us to provide faster last-iterate convergence rates against the existing payoff perturbed algorithms, even in the presence of additive noise.

View on arXivView PDF

Code Implementations

No confident code match yet

We couldn't find an author-owned or strongly-evidenced community implementation for this paper. Any repos shown below are weak matches — verify before relying on them.

No code implementations found yet.

Know of an implementation? Let us know in the comments below!

Similar Papers

Cite this paper

@article{abe2024boosting,
  title  = {Boosting Perturbed Gradient Ascent for Last-Iterate Convergence in Games},
  author = {Kenshi Abe and Mitsuki Sakamoto and Kaito Ariu and Atsushi Iwasaki},
  year   = {2024},
  eprint = {2410.02388},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.02388},
  journal = {ICLR 2024 2024}
}

Add a badge to your README

Shows whether official code is linked for this paper.

Code of Paper badge
[![Code of Paper](https://codeofpaper.com/badge/2410.02388.svg)](https://codeofpaper.com/paper/2410.02388)

Discussion