A Case for AI Consciousness: Language Agents and Global Workspace Theory

Simon Goldstein, Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini
10/15/2024
cs.AIq-bio.NC

No confident code implementation found for this paper.

Abstract

It is generally assumed that existing artificial systems are not phenomenally conscious, and that the construction of phenomenally conscious artificial systems would require significant technological progress if it is possible at all. We challenge this assumption by arguing that if Global Workspace Theory (GWT) - a leading scientific theory of phenomenal consciousness - is correct, then instances of one widely implemented AI architecture, the artificial language agent, might easily be made phenomenally conscious if they are not already. Along the way, we articulate an explicit methodology for thinking about how to apply scientific theories of consciousness to artificial systems and employ this methodology to arrive at a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal consciousness according to GWT.

View on arXivView PDF

Code Implementations

No confident code match yet

We couldn't find an author-owned or strongly-evidenced community implementation for this paper. Any repos shown below are weak matches — verify before relying on them.

No code implementations found yet.

Know of an implementation? Let us know in the comments below!

Similar Papers

Cite this paper

@article{goldstein2024case,
  title  = {A Case for AI Consciousness: Language Agents and Global Workspace Theory},
  author = {Simon Goldstein and Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini},
  year   = {2024},
  eprint = {2410.11407},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.11407v1}
}

Add a badge to your README

Shows whether official code is linked for this paper.

Code of Paper badge
[![Code of Paper](https://codeofpaper.com/badge/2410.11407.svg)](https://codeofpaper.com/paper/2410.11407)

Discussion