Detection of Physiological Data Tampering Attacks with Quantum Machine Learning

Md. Saif Hassan Onim, Himanshu Thapliyal
2/9/2025
quant-phcs.LG

No confident code implementation found for this paper. 5 possible matches can be shown below.

Abstract

The widespread use of cloud-based medical devices and wearable sensors has made physiological data susceptible to tampering. These attacks can compromise the reliability of healthcare systems which can be critical and life-threatening. Detection of such data tampering is of immediate need. Machine learning has been used to detect anomalies in datasets but the performance of Quantum Machine Learning (QML) is still yet to be evaluated for physiological sensor data. Thus, our study compares the effectiveness of QML for detecting physiological data tampering, focusing on two types of white-box attacks: data poisoning and adversarial perturbation. The results show that QML models are better at identifying label-flipping attacks, achieving accuracy rates of 75%-95% depending on the data and attack severity. This superior performance is due to the ability of quantum algorithms to handle complex and high-dimensional data. However, both QML and classical models struggle to detect more sophisticated adversarial perturbation attacks, which subtly alter data without changing its statistical properties. Although QML performed poorly against this attack with around 45%-65% accuracy, it still outperformed classical algorithms in some cases.

View on arXivView PDF

Code Implementations

No confident code match yet

We couldn't find an author-owned or strongly-evidenced community implementation for this paper. 5 weaker matches are hidden by default — verify before relying on them.

No code implementations found yet.

Know of an implementation? Let us know in the comments below!

Similar Papers

Cite this paper

@article{onim2025detection,
  title  = {Detection of Physiological Data Tampering Attacks with Quantum Machine Learning},
  author = {Md. Saif Hassan Onim and Himanshu Thapliyal},
  year   = {2025},
  eprint = {2502.05966},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2502.05966v1}
}

Add a badge to your README

Shows whether official code is linked for this paper.

Code of Paper badge
[![Code of Paper](https://codeofpaper.com/badge/2502.05966.svg)](https://codeofpaper.com/paper/2502.05966)

Discussion