Rational Capability in Concurrent Games

Yinfeng Li, Emiliano Lorini, Munyque Mittelmann
2/17/2025
cs.LOcs.MA

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Abstract

We extend concurrent game structures (CGSs) with a simple notion of preference over computations and define a minimal notion of rationality for agents based on the concept of dominance. We use this notion to interpret a CL and an ATL languages that extend the basic CL and ATL languages with modalities for rational capability, namely, a coalition's capability to rationally enforce a given property. For each of these languages, we provide results about the complexity of satisfiability checking and model checking as well as about axiomatization.

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Cite this paper

@article{li2025rational,
  title  = {Rational Capability in Concurrent Games},
  author = {Yinfeng Li and Emiliano Lorini and Munyque Mittelmann},
  year   = {2025},
  eprint = {2502.12286},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2502.12286v1}
}

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