A Survey of Attacks on Large Language Models

Wenrui Xu, Keshab K. Parhi
5/18/2025
cs.CRcs.AI

No confident code implementation found for this paper. 2 possible matches can be shown below.

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based agents have been widely deployed in a wide range of applications in the real world, including healthcare diagnostics, financial analysis, customer support, robotics, and autonomous driving, expanding their powerful capability of understanding, reasoning, and generating natural languages. However, the wide deployment of LLM-based applications exposes critical security and reliability risks, such as the potential for malicious misuse, privacy leakage, and service disruption that weaken user trust and undermine societal safety. This paper provides a systematic overview of the details of adversarial attacks targeting both LLMs and LLM-based agents. These attacks are organized into three phases in LLMs: Training-Phase Attacks, Inference-Phase Attacks, and Availability & Integrity Attacks. For each phase, we analyze the details of representative and recently introduced attack methods along with their corresponding defenses. We hope our survey will provide a good tutorial and a comprehensive understanding of LLM security, especially for attacks on LLMs. We desire to raise attention to the risks inherent in widely deployed LLM-based applications and highlight the urgent need for robust mitigation strategies for evolving threats.

View on arXivView PDF

Code Implementations

No confident code match yet

We couldn't find an author-owned or strongly-evidenced community implementation for this paper. 2 weaker matches are hidden by default — verify before relying on them.

No code implementations found yet.

Know of an implementation? Let us know in the comments below!

Similar Papers

Cite this paper

@article{xu2025survey,
  title  = {A Survey of Attacks on Large Language Models},
  author = {Wenrui Xu and Keshab K. Parhi},
  year   = {2025},
  eprint = {2505.12567},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2505.12567v1}
}

Add a badge to your README

Shows whether official code is linked for this paper.

Code of Paper badge
[![Code of Paper](https://codeofpaper.com/badge/2505.12567.svg)](https://codeofpaper.com/paper/2505.12567)

Discussion