Provably Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Pengcheng Zhou, Yinglun Feng, Zhongliang Yang
8/1/2025
cs.CRcs.AI

No confident code implementation found for this paper.

Abstract

Although Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems have been widely applied, the privacy and security risks they face, such as data leakage and data poisoning, have not been systematically addressed yet. Existing defense strategies primarily rely on heuristic filtering or enhancing retriever robustness, which suffer from limited interpretability, lack of formal security guarantees, and vulnerability to adaptive attacks. To address these challenges, this paper proposes the first provably secure framework for RAG systems(SAG). Our framework employs a pre-storage full-encryption scheme to ensure dual protection of both retrieved content and vector embeddings, guaranteeing that only authorized entities can access the data. Through formal security proofs, we rigorously verify the scheme's confidentiality and integrity under a computational security model. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmark datasets demonstrate that our framework effectively resists a range of state-of-the-art attacks. This work establishes a theoretical foundation and practical paradigm for verifiably secure RAG systems, advancing AI-powered services toward formally guaranteed security.

View on arXivView PDF

Code Implementations

No confident code match yet

We couldn't find an author-owned or strongly-evidenced community implementation for this paper. Any repos shown below are weak matches — verify before relying on them.

No code implementations found yet.

Know of an implementation? Let us know in the comments below!

Similar Papers

Cite this paper

@article{zhou2025provably,
  title  = {Provably Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation},
  author = {Pengcheng Zhou and Yinglun Feng and Zhongliang Yang},
  year   = {2025},
  eprint = {2508.01084},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2508.01084v1}
}

Add a badge to your README

Shows whether official code is linked for this paper.

Code of Paper badge
[![Code of Paper](https://codeofpaper.com/badge/2508.01084.svg)](https://codeofpaper.com/paper/2508.01084)

Discussion