Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Generated Reviews of Scientific Publications

Janis Keuper
9/12/2025
cs.LG

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Abstract

The ongoing intense discussion on rising LLM usage in the scientific peer-review process has recently been mingled by reports of authors using hidden prompt injections to manipulate review scores. Since the existence of such "attacks" - although seen by some commentators as "self-defense" - would have a great impact on the further debate, this paper investigates the practicability and technical success of the described manipulations. Our systematic evaluation uses 1k reviews of 2024 ICLR papers generated by a wide range of LLMs shows two distinct results: I) very simple prompt injections are indeed highly effective, reaching up to 100% acceptance scores. II) LLM reviews are generally biased toward acceptance (>95% in many models). Both results have great impact on the ongoing discussions on LLM usage in peer-review.

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Cite this paper

@article{keuper2025prompt,
  title  = {Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Generated Reviews of Scientific Publications},
  author = {Janis Keuper},
  year   = {2025},
  eprint = {2509.10248},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2509.10248v3}
}

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