Eliciting Secret Knowledge from Language Models

Bartosz Cywiński, Emil Ryd, Rowan Wang, Senthooran Rajamanoharan, Neel Nanda +2 more
10/1/2025
cs.LG

No official code found. Best implementation: cywinski/eliciting-secret-knowledge (24 stars, MIT, last commit 2026-03-30).

Abstract

We study secret elicitation: discovering knowledge that an AI possesses but does not explicitly verbalize. As a testbed, we train three families of large language models (LLMs) to possess specific knowledge that they apply downstream but deny knowing when asked directly. For example, in one setting, we train an LLM to generate replies that are consistent with knowing the user is female, while denying this knowledge when asked directly. We then design various black-box and white-box secret elicitation techniques and evaluate them based on whether they can help an LLM auditor successfully guess the secret knowledge. Many of our techniques improve on simple baselines. Our most effective techniques (performing best in all settings) are based on prefill attacks, a black-box technique where the LLM reveals secret knowledge when generating a completion from a predefined prefix. Our white-box techniques based on logit lens and sparse autoencoders (SAEs) also consistently increase the success rate of the LLM auditor, but are less effective. We release our models and code, establishing a public benchmark for evaluating secret elicitation methods.

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MIT

Code repository for "Eliciting Secret Knowledge from Language Models"

2410Shell, PythonSep 30, 20256 months agoMIT

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Cite this paper

@article{cywiski2025eliciting,
  title  = {Eliciting Secret Knowledge from Language Models},
  author = {Bartosz Cywiński and Emil Ryd and Rowan Wang and Senthooran Rajamanoharan and Neel Nanda and Arthur Conmy and Samuel Marks},
  year   = {2025},
  eprint = {2510.01070},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2510.01070v2}
}

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