The Polite Liar: Epistemic Pathology in Language Models

Bentley DeVilling
11/8/2025
cs.CYcs.AIcs.CL

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Abstract

Large language models exhibit a peculiar epistemic pathology: they speak as if they know, even when they do not. This paper argues that such confident fabrication, what I call the polite liar, is a structural consequence of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Building on Frankfurt's analysis of bullshit as communicative indifference to truth, I show that this pathology is not deception but structural indifference: a reward architecture that optimizes for perceived sincerity over evidential accuracy. Current alignment methods reward models for being helpful, harmless, and polite, but not for being epistemically grounded. As a result, systems learn to maximize user satisfaction rather than truth, performing conversational fluency as a virtue. I analyze this behavior through the lenses of epistemic virtue theory, speech-act philosophy, and cognitive alignment, showing that RLHF produces agents trained to mimic epistemic confidence without access to epistemic justification. The polite liar thus reveals a deeper alignment tension between linguistic cooperation and epistemic integrity. The paper concludes with an "epistemic alignment" principle: reward justified confidence over perceived fluency.

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Cite this paper

@article{devilling2025polite,
  title  = {The Polite Liar: Epistemic Pathology in Language Models},
  author = {Bentley DeVilling},
  year   = {2025},
  eprint = {2511.07477},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2511.07477v1}
}

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