Insured Agents: A Decentralized Trust Insurance Mechanism for Agentic Economy

Botao 'Amber' Hu, Bangdao Chen
12/9/2025
cs.CYcs.MA

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Abstract

The emerging "agentic web" envisions large populations of autonomous agents coordinating, transacting, and delegating across open networks. Yet many agent communication and commerce protocols treat agents as low-cost identities, despite the empirical reality that LLM agents remain unreliable, hallucinated, manipulable, and vulnerable to prompt-injection and tool-abuse. A natural response is "agents-at-stake": binding economically meaningful, slashable collateral to persistent identities and adjudicating misbehavior with verifiable evidence. However, heterogeneous tasks make universal verification brittle and centralization-prone, while traditional reputation struggles under rapid model drift and opaque internal states. We propose a protocol-native alternative: insured agents. Specialized insurer agents post stake on behalf of operational agents in exchange for premiums, and receive privileged, privacy-preserving audit access via TEEs to assess claims. A hierarchical insurer market calibrates stake through pricing, decentralizes verification via competitive underwriting, and yields incentive-compatible dispute resolution.

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@article{hu2025insured,
  title  = {Insured Agents: A Decentralized Trust Insurance Mechanism for Agentic Economy},
  author = {Botao 'Amber' Hu and Bangdao Chen},
  year   = {2025},
  eprint = {2512.08737},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2512.08737v1}
}

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