How to Disclose? Strategic AI Disclosure in Crowdfunding

Ning Wang, Chen Liang
2/17/2026
cs.HCcs.AI

No confident code implementation found for this paper.

Abstract

As artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly integrates into crowdfunding practices, strategic disclosure of AI involvement has become critical. Yet, empirical insights into how different disclosure strategies influence investor decisions remain limited. Drawing on signaling theory and Aristotle's rhetorical framework, we examine how mandatory AI disclosure affects crowdfunding performance and how substantive signals (degree of AI involvement) and rhetorical signals (logos/explicitness, ethos/authenticity, pathos/emotional tone) moderate these effects. Leveraging Kickstarter's mandatory AI disclosure policy as a natural experiment and four supplementary online experiments, we find that mandatory AI disclosure significantly reduces crowdfunding performance: funds raised decline by 39.8% and backer counts by 23.9% for AI-involved projects. However, this adverse effect is systematically moderated by disclosure strategy. Greater AI involvement amplifies the negative effects of AI disclosure, while high authenticity and high explicitness mitigate them. Interestingly, excessive positive emotional tone (a strategy creators might intuitively adopt to counteract AI skepticism) backfires and exacerbates negative outcomes. Supplementary randomized experiments identify two underlying mechanisms: perceived creator competence and AI washing concerns. Substantive signals primarily affect competence judgments, whereas rhetorical signals operate through varied pathways: either mediator alone or both in sequence. These findings provide theoretical and practical insights for entrepreneurs, platforms, and policymakers strategically managing AI transparency in high-stakes investment contexts.

View on arXivView PDF

Code Implementations

No confident code match yet

We couldn't find an author-owned or strongly-evidenced community implementation for this paper. Any repos shown below are weak matches — verify before relying on them.

No code implementations found yet.

Know of an implementation? Let us know in the comments below!

Similar Papers

Cite this paper

@article{wang2026disclose,
  title  = {How to Disclose? Strategic AI Disclosure in Crowdfunding},
  author = {Ning Wang and Chen Liang},
  year   = {2026},
  eprint = {2602.15698},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2602.15698v1}
}

Add a badge to your README

Shows whether official code is linked for this paper.

Code of Paper badge
[![Code of Paper](https://codeofpaper.com/badge/2602.15698.svg)](https://codeofpaper.com/paper/2602.15698)

Discussion