Position: AI Agents Are Not (Yet) a Panacea for Social Simulation

Yiming Li, Dacheng Tao
2/19/2026
cs.MAcs.AIcs.CE

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Abstract

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have spurred growing interest in using LLM-integrated agents for social simulation, often under the implicit assumption that realistic population dynamics will emerge once role-specified agents are placed in a networked multi-agent setting. This position paper argues that LLM-based agents are not (yet) a panacea for social simulation. We attribute this over-optimism to a systematic mismatch between what current agent pipelines are typically optimized and validated to produce and what simulation-as-science requires. Concretely, role-playing plausibility does not imply faithful human behavioral validity; collective outcomes are frequently mediated by agent-environment co-dynamics rather than agent-agent messaging alone; and results can be dominated by interaction protocols, scheduling, and initial information priors, especially in policy-oriented settings. To make these assumptions explicit and auditable, we propose a unified formulation of AI agent-based social simulation as an environment-involved partially observable Markov game with explicit exposure and scheduling mechanisms and call for further actions.

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Cite this paper

@article{li2026position,
  title  = {Position: AI Agents Are Not (Yet) a Panacea for Social Simulation},
  author = {Yiming Li and Dacheng Tao},
  year   = {2026},
  eprint = {2603.00113},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2603.00113v1}
}

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