From Task Allocation to Risk Clearing: A Unifying Interface for Mixed Human-Agent Societies

Vassilis Vassiliades
5/26/2026
cs.MA

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Abstract

As humans, robots, and software agents increasingly share safety-critical environments, coordination must move from static task allocation to managing uncertain commitments. Existing frameworks fall short: they either assume rigid, static teams or learn opaque joint policies that are hard to adapt and difficult to integrate with human decision-makers. To overcome these limitations, we propose Risk-Aware Option Clearing (ROC), a unifying coordination mechanism in which agents expose options (temporally extended skills) paired with risk summaries that predict outcome distributions. A central clearinghouse then assigns tasks by optimizing risk-adjusted mission utility under deadlines and safety constraints. ROC is a family of mechanisms, ranging from deployments where the clearinghouse learns outcome models from data to ones that consume full distributional predictions from agents. By treating risk-aware options as the basic coordination unit, ROC sketches a scalable, transparent infrastructure for integrating heterogeneous agents into future mixed human--agent societies and outlines a research agenda for such risk-aware clearing layers.

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Cite this paper

@article{vassiliades2026from,
  title  = {From Task Allocation to Risk Clearing: A Unifying Interface for Mixed Human-Agent Societies},
  author = {Vassilis Vassiliades},
  year   = {2026},
  eprint = {2605.27547},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2605.27547v1}
}

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