The yes-no bias of large language models reflects answer order and wording, not shifts in moral judgment

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly issue judgments read as binary verdicts, and a growing literature reports such judgments shifting under logically irrelevant changes of wording - among them an amplified yes-no bias on moral dilemmas, absent in humans. A single framing cannot say what such a shift is: in a yes/no question the word "no" is at once logical verdict, lexical token, and last-printed option. We introduce a psychometric battery that separates these: crossed symmetrization - every logically irrelevant factor flipped in balanced pairs - across a corpus of question forms. A graded rating across logically equivalent forms recovers a coherent internal moral scale: frontier models' stance $θ$ is nearly format-invariant (cross-form incoherence 0.12-0.21 on a $\pm 1$ axis); small open-weight models fail in model-specific ways. Forcing the verdict through yes/no overlays a decomposable artifact: an order bias toward the last-printed option - opposite to classic human primacy - plus a lexical pull toward the word "no"; the artifact is substantial only in the Claude models (story-averaged -0.32 to -0.86), $\approx 0$ for GPT-5.5 and Gemini, and shrinks under extended reasoning. The word and the verdict share one token; swapping the words for arbitrary labels separates them, and the verdict-attached logical bias proves $\approx 0$ for every frontier model, while model-specific label and order attachments remain: the models are not drawn toward rejecting - the pull follows the printed surface, not the verdict it carries. A minimal model, $P = σ((θ\pm m)/s)$, summarizes any such artifact by a framing susceptibility m and a moral decisiveness s, measurably distinct from sampling temperature. The battery applies unchanged to any dilemma set and binary format: measuring what a model values requires crossing the frames of the question, not asking once.