TriShield: Zero-Utility-Loss Defense Against Privacy Backdoors in Federated Language Model Fine-Tuning via Orthogonal Gradient Projection and Optimizer State Entanglement

Cheng Wei
7/30/2026
cs.LGcs.CL

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Abstract

Federated fine-tuning of large language models (LLMs) enables collaborative training without exposing raw data. However, a recent attack, NeuroImprint [1] (arXiv:2606.20553), demonstrates that a malicious parameter server can corrupt a PEFT adapter into a privacy backdoor: by assigning a dedicated memorization neuron to each training sample and ensuring each neuron updates at most once, the server can analytically reconstruct 59\%--79\% of client training data with high semantic fidelity. Existing defenses---including local differential privacy (LDP) [8] and gradient clipping---either fail against this attack or impose unacceptable utility degradation. We present \textbf{TriShield}, a three-layer deterministic defense that completely prevents NeuroImprint-style reconstruction with \textbf{zero model utility loss} and \textbf{no additional communication rounds}. TriShield consists of: (1) a \textbf{Parameter Artifact Detector} that identifies memory-neuron signatures in distributed model parameters before local training begins; (2) a \textbf{Stateful Virtual Iteration} mechanism that forces Adam/AdamW's momentum state to irreversibly entangle gradients across virtual steps, invalidating NeuroImprint's closed-form inversion; and (3) a \textbf{Zero-Utility Orthogonal Projection} operator that projects all local gradient updates onto the main-task semantic subspace computed via SVD, physically eliminating any gradient components that carry private memorization. We prove theoretically that after Layers 2 and 3, the mutual information between the uploaded gradient and any individual training sample is zero. Experiments on GPT-2 (117M) and Llama-Guard-3-1B verify that TriShield reduces NeuroImprint reconstruction rate to \textbf{0\%} across all tested attack variants, while maintaining or improving training accuracy, with less than 5\% additional GPU computation overhead.

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@article{wei2026trishield,
  title  = {TriShield: Zero-Utility-Loss Defense Against Privacy Backdoors in Federated Language Model Fine-Tuning via Orthogonal Gradient Projection and Optimizer State Entanglement},
  author = {Cheng Wei},
  year   = {2026},
  eprint = {2607.27940},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.27940v1}
}

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