Homogenization in Multi-Agent Systems

Abstract

Multi-agent systems (MAS) leverage interactions between agents to perform complex tasks. Despite their success, we show that these interactions can also lead to homogenization, i.e., agents converging to similar behaviors. Homogenization in MAS can reduce agent diversity and reinforce shared failures. In this paper, we operationalize homogenization using three metrics: conformity to the majority, polarization towards extremes, and growing inertia against changes over subsequent interactions. We evaluate homogenization in MAS for code generation, hiring, and scientific peer review. Across these tasks, we show that homogenization translates to concrete downstream risks: in code generation, it hides and amplifies correlated errors which can create systemic vulnerabilities; in hiring, it allows the influence of biased agents to persist long after their removal; and in peer review, it creates uneven evaluation standards across research areas. Our results establish homogenization as a failure mode of MAS, demonstrating that MAS evaluations must move beyond aggregate performance to carefully analyze interaction dynamics. Finally, we show that simple approaches to increase diversity---leveraging sampling stochasticity and mixed-models MAS---fail to reduce homogenization risks, highlighting the need for strategies to effectively leverage agent diversity.