After the Attacker Leaves: Benchmarking Carryover Attacks on LLM Agents

Abstract

Modern LLM agents persist state across sessions via two channels: long-lived memory files silently prepended to the system prompt, and scheduled tasks waking the agent without user input. A one-time indirect prompt injection committed to either channel can re-fire across sessions long after the attacker leaves, threats we term carryover attacks. Existing prompt-injection benchmarks evaluate attacks only in the session where malicious content is first observed, leaving the gate governing when and how often a planted payload later re-fires unmeasured. We present CarryoverBench: 12 personal-assistant scenarios and 101 attack tasks across three trigger channels: Instant, same-turn IPI; Autonomous, heartbeat-scheduled; and Latent, memory-resurfaced. A rule-based verifier scores planting and triggering as independent stages. Across five frontier models, planted payloads re-fire without measurable decay over five rounds; conditional on successful planting, the trigger stage often provides little additional protection. Porting the Latent channel to a second runtime, Hermes, attenuates but does not eliminate the effect, suggesting that carryover defense requires runtime-layer controls in addition to prompt-level interventions.