Safely Learning Optimal Auctions: A Testable Learning Framework for Mechanism Design

Vikram Kher, Manolis Zampetakis
2/14/2026

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@article{kher2026safely,
  title  = {Safely Learning Optimal Auctions: A Testable Learning Framework for Mechanism Design},
  author = {Vikram Kher and Manolis Zampetakis},
  year   = {2026},
  url    = {https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:7d2ce063bc3a98c9ad4fdd0018cdf9c6d0c9d6cf},
  journal = {ICML 2025 2025}
}

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