Utility-Learning Tension in Self-Modifying Agents

Charles L. Wang, Keir Dorchen, Peter Jin
10/5/2025
cs.AIcs.LG

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Abstract

As systems trend toward superintelligence, a natural modeling premise is that agents can self-improve along every facet of their own design. We formalize this with a five-axis decomposition and a decision layer, separating incentives from learning behavior and analyzing axes in isolation. Our central result identifies and introduces a sharp utility--learning tension, the structural conflict in self-modifying systems whereby utility-driven changes that improve immediate or expected performance can also erode the statistical preconditions for reliable learning and generalization. Our findings show that distribution-free guarantees are preserved iff the policy-reachable model family is uniformly capacity-bounded; when capacity can grow without limit, utility-rational self-changes can render learnable tasks unlearnable. Under standard assumptions common in practice, these axes reduce to the same capacity criterion, yielding a single boundary for safe self-modification. Numerical experiments across several axes validate the theory by comparing destructive utility policies against our proposed two-gate policies that preserve learnability.

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Cite this paper

@article{wang2025utilitylearning,
  title  = {Utility-Learning Tension in Self-Modifying Agents},
  author = {Charles L. Wang and Keir Dorchen and Peter Jin},
  year   = {2025},
  eprint = {2510.04399},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url    = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2510.04399v1}
}

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